Defence Minister Richard Marles has defended the revised AUKUS submarine deal for Australia. The original plan was to acquire from the US one new and two second-hand Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The US has now changed this to three second-hand ones. Marles claims it is still a good deal for Australia, yet there are legitimate reasons for scepticism.
Australian governments have repeatedly defended the purchase of second-hand American naval vessels as cost-effective interim capabilities designed to plug a looming “capability gap”. But historical experience suggests caution is warranted.
Past acquisitions have often involved undisclosed maintenance backlogs, hull fatigue, corrosion problems and substantial unexpected refit costs.
The most cautionary example remains the 1994 purchase by the Keating government of two surplus US navy Newport-class tank-landing ships for about $61 million to $70 million. Renamed HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla, the vessels were intended to quickly replace the ageing HMAS Tobruk and bolster amphibious capability.
In practice, both arrived in far worse condition than expected, with extensive hull corrosion, faulty electrical systems, and machinery spaces requiring major reconstruction. What was promoted as a cheap, rapid capability boost instead became a multi-year shipyard saga. Refit costs ballooned into the hundreds of millions, with full operational entry delayed until the late 1990s.
Persistent reliability problems culminated in their early decommissioning in 2011 after emergent hull defects and mechanical failures rendered the platforms unsustainable.
The mid-life upgrade of the Adelaide-class frigates provided another lesson. The first ships (HMAS Adelaide and HMAS Canberra) were acquired new from the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but their modernisation in the early 2000s proved extremely challenging. Integrating modern electronics and weapons systems into older hulls led to major delays, significant cost overruns, and the early decommissioning of the older US-built vessels rather than completing their upgrades.
The evolving AUKUS submarine arrangement now risks repeating similar patterns. Under the original 2023 agreement, Australia was to acquire two second-hand Virginia-class submarines and one newly built boat to address the capability gap in the early 2030s. The revised plan now shifts to three in-service, second-hand boats.
Virginia-class submarines feature a non-refuellable nuclear reactor with an approximate 33-year core life. Buying vessels that have already served 10 to 15 years in the demanding US Navy environment means Australia will inherit hulls with considerably reduced remaining service life, along with the cumulative wear from high-tempo operations. This could include a significant maintenance backlog at a time when Australia’s sovereign submarine industrial base remains underdeveloped.
The US submarine industrial base is currently delivering only 1.1 to 1.2 Virginia-class boats a year – well below the roughly 2.3 needed to meet American fleet requirements while also supporting AUKUS transfers. This production shortfall helps explain why only older, in-service hulls are being offered.
Australia’s defence acquisition history shows a consistent pattern: the headline purchase price for surplus US platforms is rarely the final cost. Substantial additional expenses often emerge later during refits and maintenance.
Beyond the financial and technical risks lies a deeper strategic question. Operating American SSNs under AUKUS would closely integrate Australia into US naval operations. These submarines would most likely see action only in a US-China conflict – a scenario involving Australia’s largest trading partner. While alliance commitments matter, acquiring these vessels reduces Australia’s flexibility to make independent decisions about involvement, particularly if a future conflict begins on contested grounds.
In summary, while the Virginia-class represents a highly capable platform, the decision to acquire three used boats carries real risks of higher long-term costs, shorter operational availability, and deeper strategic entanglement.
Professor Clive Williams MG is a former Australian Defence intelligence officer who served three times with US forces.
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Professor Clive Williams is a former army and Defence officer and is director of the Terrorism Research Centre in Canberra.