Is the Axis of Authoritarians in a death spiral?
China. Russia. Iran. North Korea.
It’s supposed to be living proof that democracy and international co-operation are defunct.
It’s supposed to present a united front against the West.
It’s supposed to be a brotherhood of dictators working together to reshape the world.
“The East is rising, and the West is declining,” China’s autocratic Chairman Xi Jinping proclaimed in 2021. “We have relied on struggle up to this day, and must rely on struggle to win the future.”
But is the new Axis living up to its spin?
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin put his vision of global “spheres of influence” into effect when he invaded Ukraine in 2022.
“Victory would reassert Russia’s status and hasten a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world; instead of one great power (the United States), we’d have several. Russia would, of course, become one of the ‘greats’,” argues University of Melbourne Professor in History Mark Edele.
So, how’d that go?
“Four years on, Russia has not found itself among fellow great powers willing to divide up the globe.”
Now, fellow Axis of Authoritarian sidekick Iran is fighting for survival.
And it’s not found itself among supportive friends.
“Some observers contrast the United States’ projection of military power at muzzle velocity with China’s inaction. They argue that Beijing can do little but watch its friends fall one by one, seriously diminishing its global influence,” notes Global Research Institute analyst Sailor Miao.
“(But) China’s restraint should not be mistaken for fecklessness; it reflects a carefully calibrated strategic choice. One reason China can afford such restraint is because Iran is not in China’s core national interest – it is a temporary resource partner rather than an ally.”
Is the Axis of Authoritarians based on little more than mutual self-interest?
“Critics may put anti-Western dictators into one basket, but the dictators themselves do not necessarily see it that way,” argues Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre analyst Alexander Baunov.
“The axis of autocrats is complicated”.
Wheels of power
President Putin and Chairman Xi Jinping put on a brave face during a video call last month.
Chairman Xi again called on like-minded nations to accept the inevitability of his “grand plan” for a new world order.
He and Putin had already “exchanged views on major strategic issues,” and used “a historic opportunity to continue deepening strategic co-operation,” he said.
President Putin, who initiated a bungled invasion of Ukraine in 2022, was more worried about security.
“Amid the growing global turbulence, the foreign policy link between Moscow and Beijing has remained a major stabilising factor,” he told state-controlled media.
The two leaders are striving to present an image of reliability against erratic Western interference.
“It has become increasingly common in US political discourse to describe China and Iran, alongside Russia and North Korea, as an axis of ‘upheaval, chaos,’ or ‘autocracy,’ supposedly united in their efforts to undermine US power and reshape the international order,” notes University of Pennsylvania China analyst Aaron Glasserman.
“The strategic significance of this partnership should not be overstated. Iran needs China, but China does not need Iran.”
But does China need Russia?
Beijing has been there for its Moscow friend. At a price.
It is supplying Moscow with 80 per cent of the critical components it needs for its war effort. It tells the world these “dual-use” parts are for peaceful purposes.
It buys Moscow’s oil – at heavily discounted prices. It says this is to keep the Russian economy afloat.
North Korea needs Russia.
So Chairman Kim Jong-un has sent tens of thousands of troops to bolster Russia’s front lines. Not to mention millions of rounds of artillery ammunition.
Iran, however, didn’t qualify.
“The CCP’s dogma of inevitability rested on Iran’s ability to endure, and Epic Fury removed the foundation in a single afternoon,” argues Hudson Institute researcher Zineb Riboua.
“Every available response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf leads Beijing into a trap of its own contradictions.”
Axis of self-interest
A dictator’s number one goal is survival.
All aspects of domestic, economic and foreign policy must reflect this.
And Ayatollah Khamenei’s failure was to be of sufficient value to Beijing and Moscow.
Tehran may have supplied the Kremlin with revolutionary new drone designs, missile components and military expertise for its struggle to seize Kyiv. And it has boldly supported Moscow’s pitch that Ukraine was never a country in the first place.
But, in Iran’s darkest hour, the Kremlin remains mute.
Tehran may have invented a convoluted sanctions-busting network to supply Beijing with 80 per cent of its oil production (at cut-rate prices). It may have loudly supported its plans for alternative economic and legal frameworks.
But, in Iran’s darkest hour, the Chinese Communist Party remains mute.
“Xi bet a decade of foreign policy on Khamenei’s ability to survive American pressure, and the bet did not pay off,” states Riboua.
Beijing has not called an emergency United Nations session. It has initiated no diplomatic response. No military assets have been moved – despite the death of one of its citizens in Tehran and the need to evacuate 3000 citizens.
“China’s old selling point was very simple and transactional: We buy your oil and never mention human rights,” Riboua adds.
“That pitch loses its utility when Gulf producers already feel protected by an American security guarantee that just proved, on live television, that it works”.
But Beijing isn’t worried about Iran. It’s worried about oil.
Iran supplies China with just 13 per cent of its needs.
The Middle East, as a whole, supplies 55 per cent.
Beijing has invested billions in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman. That infrastructure is now under attack – by Iran.
“China’s priority now is … not ensuring the survival of an Iranian regime that is dependent on China but preserving its own interests in the wider region,” argues Glasserman.
And most of its oil must be carried by tankers.
“(The) one thing China worries about – and what could sway Beijing’s calculus and force it off the sidelines – is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz,” states Stimson Centre China analyst Yun Sun.
Strange bedfellows
“Putin may flaunt his strength and play the role of a strongman who does what he likes, but in reality, he cannot even afford to verbally attack a US president even as that president is destroying Putin’s allies,” states Carnegie’s Baunov.
The Kremlin despot enjoys sharing the spotlight with Chairman Xi. And he’s been feted by sympathetic nations as a world leader.
But Russia’s long history with Venezuela wasn’t enough for President Maduro.
And now Iran’s once-friendly regime has become a dead weight.
“An old ideological and geopolitical ally has been killed with the full support of another anticipated ideological and geopolitical partner: US President Donald Trump,” Baunov explains.
“The Russian regime has built its strategy on Trump being distinct from his predecessors in the White House. His attack on yet another dictatorship undermines that strategy, which hinges on hopes for a Trump-led political revolution across the West.”
The Trump-Putin bromance had been going so well.
Washington has all but halted its support for Ukraine’s resistance. Its heated rhetoric has been redirected towards its old NATO allies. And its expansionist ambitions have focused on Greenland.
The seizure of Maduro wasn’t great. But it wasn’t awful, either.
“Seen from the Kremlin, Trump’s actions in Latin America legitimise its own claim of a sphere of influence in Ukraine, Europe, and beyond. And after all, capture and arrest fall short of assassination,” Baunov explains.
But Iran is different.
It is part of what Moscow regards as its “sphere of influence”.
Beijing, for its part, thinks the same.
Tehran was, after all, a member of the Russia-China-led BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) affiliation of nations.
“Beijing is unlikely to try to backstop the Iranian regime because of China’s relationship with the United States,” adds the Stimson Centre’s Yun.
President Trump and Chairman Xi are due to meet later this month, “a meeting that carries the prospect of a potential grand bargain … that could lead to a real détente after eight traumatising years of great-power competition,” Yun explains.
Survival of the fittest
President Trump has adopted a very abrupt foreign policy.
The pivot from negotiations to war takes place in an instant.
“If top-level negotiations are no obstacle to a leader’s removal – and the shift from one to the other can take place in an instant – what does that mean for Putin if the outcome of negotiations over Ukraine do not satisfy Trump?” Baunov asks.
The Kremlin may be a nuclear power.
But it’s no longer an economic or military one.
“Unable to subdue Ukraine, Russia’s power projection suffered elsewhere,” argues Professor Edele. “In a lawless international order, it is too inconsequential to dictate the play.”
Putin may project an image of power at home.
But Ukraine’s drone, missile and assassination attacks on Moscow have exposed the emperor’s new clothes as nothing but hot air.
“Russia really does rank alongside Iran, Syria, and Venezuela,” states Baunov. “That is why, despite all the differences between them, Putin takes such a personal interest in the fates of Khamenei, Maduro, former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, and other fellow authoritarians”.
Putin’s weakness is also obvious to Xi.
“True, China has celebrated a ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia, its biggest neighbour,” Professor Edele explains. “But it neither took clear sides in Russia’s Ukraine war, nor sent weapons. Instead, Beijing used Russia’s isolation to cement a relationship in which it clearly has the upper hand.”
Even India has moved to exploit Russia’s struggle rather than support it, he adds.
Now, Putin must face the prospect of followers seeking to establish a line of succession.
It’s a move the Russian President has actively resisted for decades.
But, for Russia’s oligarchs, it may be a matter of self-preservation.
“(Trump’s) approach appears to be to remove the top official, eliminate other irreconcilable elements if necessary, and force those remaining to comply under threat of annihilation while simultaneously calling on the people to seize power,” Baunov concludes.
New World Opportunism
“Russia underestimated the extent to which the old order gave it room to manoeuvre. Then, as long as others played by the rules, breaking them could give Russia a tactical advantage,” states Professor Edele.
“But once others also opted for raw power, the limits of Russia’s abilities became obvious.”
It’s an argument that could equally apply to China.
At least for as long as President Trump remains in power.
“Although he insists that his goal is not to export democracy but to benefit US security and eliminate threats, it is authoritarian regimes that are coming under fire,” Baunov points out.
“Although the Trump administration squeezes friend and foe alike, it is the internal fragility and lack of legitimacy that makes autocracies faster to crumble.”
Moscow and Beijing must therefore make the best of a bad situation.
They could help rebuild Iran into a more reliable partner. They could rebrand themselves as islands of rationality standing against the United States.
But first, they must get there.
China needs oil for its combat jets and warships. But its stockpiles are only enough to sustain three months of peacetime activity.
“If the Iranian regime withstands US and Israeli bombardment and inflicts real damage in its counterstrikes, it would create a dilemma for Beijing,” argues Yun.
“Iran is still China’s key regional partner. Refusing to provide support even if Iran demonstrates its resolve and capability of withstanding attacks would reveal China’s lack of commitment.”
And that’s the problem.
Alliances are expected to mean something.
“Xi’s story is collapsing from the inside,” argues Riboua. The story he told 1.4 billion people — that America is a declining power incapable of decisive force projection — does not match what happened in mere hours over Tehran.
“And if the story is wrong about Iran, the unavoidable next question is whether it was ever right about anything else.”
