The other issue is fleet balance. For this, a navy needs a combination of high and low-end capabilities, both crewed and uncrewed. It’s ironic that one of the first US strategists to openly discuss this hi-lo mix was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt whose name was given to a class of large, high-end destroyers which became so complex it had to be cancelled after just three were built. You have to be very optimistic not to see how the Trump class could go the same way.
At the high end, the US Navy excels with its huge aircraft carriers and amphibious ships – although by hull numbers at least, the Chinese Navy is becoming a serious adversary. Then there are surface warships and attack submarines. Here, again, the US Navy is leagues ahead, although some of their destroyers, whilst still excellent, are ageing, and their ancient missile cruisers are on the way out. These old Ticonderoga-class cruisers are essentially larger destroyers with more Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) and a refined ability to direct area air defence. Destroyers and dispersed systems can handle these tasks, and for me, that would take priority over a new class of cruiser or battleship.
A Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam sails in the South China Sea.Credit: US Navy/AP
Below this, the US Navy starts to look thin. They don’t have a frigate – a specialist anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ship – and the Russian, Chinese and rogue conventional and uncrewed threat demands this now more than ever. The US Navy does need a large number of lower-end cutter-type ships, but it also needs dedicated submarine hunters. This large and important gap in the US Navy remains.
Navies and often external analysts tend to obsess over high-end roles, writing off anything that isn’t peer-combat capable. But this ignores the fact that naval forces spend nearly all their time setting the conditions to avoid conflict. This is why mass and presence are so important. It has to be backed up by the high-end stuff if the deterrent effect is to be maximised, but it’s frustrating to see how many people write off things like the cutter plan as useless before seeing what it can do.
Against all this, can a case for an American battleship/cruiser be made? Yes, it can. This ship represents ambition, presence, and symbolism – all good, positive things. At a more operational level, it would house a vast quantity of missile launch tubes and large radars optimised for hypersonic missile tracking. It would have lots of room for useful guns in calibres suited to anti-drone use – and maybe one day electrically powered railguns, if that technology ever matures. The US has given up trying to build railguns, but Japan is still working on them.
If nuclear propulsion is chosen, the new battlewagon could have near-unlimited range and massive power generation. The power would not be for greater speed, but for data processing, electronic warfare, laser weapons and possibly railguns. New battleships could take on the fleet Command and Control function currently provided by the ageing Mount Whitney class.
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However, I sincerely doubt that any new battleship could survive a hit from the champion ship killer, the heavyweight torpedo. After all, the old armoured battleships could be sunk by torpedoes. They could also be sunk by aircraft bombs, and there are plenty of anti-ship missiles out there that hit just as hard as bombs. So the Trump class ships would need layers of defence like those provided for aircraft carriers: and the outer layer is provided by the carrier’s fighter jets, which the battlewagon would not have.
And while it is true that the proposed battleships would have useful things, it would usually make more sense to break them up across smaller, more numerous platforms. So that leaves us with presence and prestige as the only unique things the battleships would bring to the party.
Then, estimates suggest these ships will cost $US9 billion per hull if made in numbers: $US14 billion for the first one. That’s the same as a Ford class supercarrier, even more if nuclear propulsion is chosen. That’s a lot of money in one hull when most of what you want it to do can be done better and more cheaply by something else. What price prestige? This before the matter of yard capacity to build it is discussed, which has even the most ardent optimists scratching their heads. Or pulling their hair out in frustration at what has become of US shipbuilding.
Meanwhile, China, with impeccable and probably not coincidental timing, has just permitted the circulation of images of a container ship – Zhong Da 79 – fitted with containerised VLS (around 60 missile tubes), radars and close-in weapons systems (CIWS – auto gun systems that can take out incoming missiles and drones). The Chinese have got the dispersal memo. The weight of fire, deception and sheer numbers this option could provide is deeply worrying. Their direction of travel is clear, albeit they are also continuing with high-end warship design and build at a high rate. As a concept, arming merchant vessels has been around for decades and has been trialled by both US and British navies. Until now, no one has taken it seriously.
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The Chinese threat and the good health of the US Navy concerns us all. The mistakes of the Zumwalt, Littoral Combat Ship and Constellation classes made us all less safe, not just the US Navy. All three were actually needed to a greater or lesser degree. All three were botched in the delivery to the point of early cancellation, and billions were wasted.
The trouble with the Trump ship is it feels like a fourth mistake waiting to happen. If their yards were churning out frigates and patrol vessels and had plans for the replacement destroyer, and the President wanted battleships as a status symbol on top of that, that would be fine. The problem is that this project is likely to divert money and yard capacity away from things that are needed more.
Sipping deep from the Christmas cup of optimism, maybe this idea, and the presidential impetus behind it, will breathe new life into the US shipbuilding system, even if the golden mega-ship never materialises. I hope so, because that is everyone’s business.
Tom Sharpe was a British Royal Navy officer for 27 years, commanding four warships.
Telegraph, London
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