Debates about immigration have long shaped Australian politics. Often the debate is framed around the notion of a “Big Australia”. These discussions have intensified since the pandemic, as volatility in arrivals and departures and concerns about housing, infrastructure, and wages brought migration policy back into focus.
Much of this debate rests on misconceptions – such as the belief that Labor backs a “Big Australia” while the Coalition is tough on migration. Analysis by the ANU Migration Hub shows that while both major parties have influenced policy, long-term growth in migration – especially temporary migration – has been driven more by Coalition governments.
The tide of migration has been affected by many factors since Covid, with the net rate now falling rapidly.Credit: Dionne
The recent rise in Net Overseas Migration (NOM) is often cited as proof of a deliberate policy of mass immigration. In fact, it reflects a global trend. All advanced economies saw migration collapse during COVID-19, followed by a temporary rebound as borders reopened. This “whipsaw effect” – a sharp fall, brief surge, then return to normal– was not unique to Australia.
The pandemic disrupted migration on a scale unseen since World War I. The Coalition’s visa extensions allowed temporary visa holders to remain, reducing departures. Labor later kept some measures and fast-tracked visa processing to fill labour shortages. Both parties shaped Australia’s whipsaw pattern, but neither caused it. Migration rose mainly because global mobility rebounded, not due to any “Big Australia” policy. And with departures on the rise, net migration is falling rapidly.
The more significant trend is the steady rise in temporary migration since the late 1990s, under governments of both colours – though expansions have been more common under the Coalition. Coalition governments introduced and expanded key programs such as the 457 skilled visa, post-study work rights, and most of Australia’s working holiday agreements. They also encouraged universities to rely on full-fee-paying international students, linking higher education funding to migration. These moves made sectors like education, hospitality, and agriculture dependent on a steady inflow of temporary migrants.
Labor governments, by contrast, have tended to tighten or regulate migration. They have raised English-language and savings requirements, strengthened labour market testing, imposed stricter compliance standards on education providers, and limited “visa hopping”. The Rudd and Gillard governments curbed student migration by removing low-skilled occupations from the skilled list, while the Albanese government has applied stronger integrity rules to student and skilled visa programs.
Taken together, these patterns show that the rise in migration stems not from a consistent “Big Australia” policy under Labor, but from market-oriented reforms introduced under the Coalition.
Political rhetoric on migration often diverges from policy outcomes. Coalition leaders have advocated tighter border control while expanding employer-driven migration. Labor leaders have promoted openness and diversity while introducing measures that restrict migration. This reflects what scholars call the “strange bedfellows” dynamic: right-leaning parties balance nationalist voters wary of migration with business groups that depend on it, while left-leaning parties juggle socially liberal supporters and unions concerned about wage impacts. The result is a mix of rhetoric and pragmatism on both sides.
Less visible – but more important– has been the decline in Australia’s capacity to manage migration effectively. In 1996, the Howard Government abolished the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, which had provided independent, evidence-based analysis. Later Coalition governments replaced the immigration department with a new Department of Home Affairs, further fragmenting policymaking. Key functions such as visa compliance were reduced or removed, allowing widespread misuse of the visa system.
